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Abstract 
This paper explores Jean Starobinski’s often tacit conception of the implied 
author, with a view to clarifying his intellectual legacy for literary criticism. It 
argues that it is plausible to trace a certain strand in the intellectual genealogy 
of Starobinski’s literary theory from the descriptive psychology of Wilhelm 
Dilthey to twentieth-century psychoanalysis and phenomenology. 
Accordingly, the question ―Who is Jean Starobinski?‖ is formulated in a 
sense which seeks to move beyond the bare facticity of biographical detail, a 
sense that can be expected to differentiate between scholarly and purely 
journalistic enquiry to ask: who, exactly, is the Jean Starobinski that we 
encounter in his major works—works like ―The Living Eye,‖ and 
―Transparency and Obstruction‖? It is from this vantage point that the 
discussion proceeds to clarify Starobinski’s ambivalent relations to both 
Rousseau and Freud, and thereby to illuminate some of the tensions and 
nuances inherent in his notion of the implied author. 
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1: Introduction 
 
Jean Starobinski enquires inter alia into the nature and the person of the 
implied author: the implied author of Rousseau’s corpus and that of Freud; of 
that of Voltaire; of that of Diderot, Montesquieu, Stendhal. The list goes on. 
More generally, he asks by implication: who is the implied author as such? 
How should s/he be conceived? In the case of Starobinski, then,  
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we find that there is a certain recursivity to the question of his identity, since 
his most important ―identity,‖ under the aspect of this essay, is the one 
inseparable from his thought as registered in his published writings. It makes 
sense, then, to investigate Starobinski’s conception of the implied author, not 
only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a way of contributing to the wider 
project of clarifying just who, intellectually speaking, Starobinski really is.  
This will require some acquaintance with aspects of the intellectual 
genealogy of the Geneva School of literary criticism. Our subject is linked 
with the German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). 
Dilthey was after all one of the first to formulate the notion of the life-world, 
and to analyze our lived experience of it. (He called this activity ―descriptive 
psychology.‖) He was also an important contributor to the development of the 
notion of a worldview [Weltanschauung], which is supposed to constitute a 
coherent perspective on life, incorporating one’s values, and the feelings, 
desires, and volitions that those values motivate. This is not to say that the 
roots of all important ideas underpinning the Geneva School inevitably lead 
back only to Dilthey. If one goes back further, one finds that it was Humboldt 
(1767–1835) who emphasized the centrality of one’s language in shaping 
one’s worldview, and Schleiermacher (1768–1834) may be credited with 
conceiving of the hermeneutic circle, the idea that the respective 
interpretations of a body of work and its constituent parts are interdependent. 
Yet it was Dilthey who first properly and most fully elaborated upon the 
notion of interpretation as the intersubjectively verifiable and 
―imaginational‖1 re-enactment of the subjective experiences of another 
person. I would go so far as to suggest that it is in fact Dilthey who in large 
measure prefigures the central Geneva School conviction that what matters 
most in the interpretation of a literary work is the life-world of the author. 
 Crucially for the Geneva School, the first half of the twentieth-century 
saw the emergence of two quite distinct approaches to investigating mental 
processes, both of which turned out to be relevant to literary theory. On the 
one hand, there was the development of the modern disciplines of psychology 
and psychoanalysis, both of which had methodological aspirations to become 
rigorous empirical sciences. The scientific orientation of modern psychology 
meant that it was committed to the view that mental states and processes were 
ultimately to be explained in terms of properties of the natural world. On the 
other hand, the phenomenological movement founded by Edmund Husserl 
developed a critique of psychologism, according to which intentionality could 
only be fully understood and accounted for by           [continued overleaf] 
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means of an investigation into the nature of conscious experience from a first-
person perspective. Phenomenology was intended to be a foundation for the 
sciences (and not itself part of the sciences) by making explicit certain 
assumptions about the nature of conscious experience that scientific 
investigation already presupposed implicitly. In this sense, it provided a way 
of rehabilitating aspects of Dilthey’s ―descriptive psychology,‖ in the face of 
a new wave of psychologistic empiricism. I maintain that the Geneva School 
derived much of its vibrancy as an intellectual force in twentieth-century 
literary theory by virtue of its active engagement with important 
developments in the fields of both psychology and phenomenology. 
 Starobinski is an important case in point vis-à-vis the bringing to bear 
of both psychology and phenomenology upon literary studies. Robert 
Magliola goes so far as to assert that ―[Starobinski’s] dependence on Husserl 
is widely acknowledged‖, and that Starobinski’s essay ―Poppaea’s Veil‖ is 
―grounded securely in Husserlian principles.‖2 These claims appear slightly 
overstated, the former because ―dependence‖ is too strong a characterization 
of Starobinski’s relation to Husserl, and the latter because while ―Poppaea’s 
Veil‖ engages with the role of the imagination in the phenomenology of 
apperception, its relation to the Husserlian position on this matter is far looser 
than Magliola implies. Nonetheless, with recalibration, the gist of what 
Magliola suggests is right, since Starobinski recognizes the significance to 
literary studies of the phenomenological movement’s fundamental interest in 
providing a descriptive account of phenomenal experience, and in elucidating 
its essential structures; in the centrality of intersubjectivity to human 
experience; and in the pervasive role of the imagination, in various guises, in 
the constitution of the life-world. To that extent, there is an undeniable debt in 
Starobinski’s writings to Husserl, and additionally to Merleau-Ponty, who 
emphasizes more than Husserl the interwovenness of language and thought. It 
was Merleau-Ponty who made the striking claim that phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis are ―directed toward the same latency [of lived experience],‖3 
a remark to which Starobinski draws attention.
4
 We can be sure that this 
observation of Merleau-Ponty’s must have resonated strongly with 
Starobinski, who originally studied medicine, became a medical doctor, and 
interlaced his early academic career with postings as a physician at various 
Swiss clinics, including a psychiatric hospital in Lausanne, before turning 
full-time to academic life in 1958 at the age of thirty-eight. It is therefore not 
surprising that Starobinski’s writing is often imbued with the tincture of the 
psychoanalyst-analysand relation. 
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 I want to suggest that Starobinski’s project cannot be properly 
understood without an adequate grasp of his relation to Freud, which takes us 
deep into Starobinski’s method for the apperception of the implied author of a 
text. I shall begin by elaborating further on the bearing of Freudian 
psychoanalysis on Starobinski’s approach to literary criticism, before 
proceeding to discuss at greater length Starobinski’s encounter with 
Rousseau. I adopt this order of topics because Starobinski, on my reading at 
least, enlists the assistance of Freud in making sense of Rousseau’s 
psychological theory, for instance via the concepts of narcissism, and the 
compensatory theory of art, and in making sense of Rousseau himself, for 
instance, via the concepts of neurosis and paranoia. In order to understand 
Starobinski’s reading of Rousseau, we need to understand certain aspects of 
Starobinski’s reading of Freud. Taken together, my hope is that the 
conjunction of these enquiries in this article will go some way toward 
explaining why Starobinski has an important place among the so-called 
Geneva School ―critics of consciousness.‖ 
 
2: Starobinski and Freud 
 
Starobinski understands artistic creativity to be the special ability of giving a 
voice to something which cannot speak on its own, the deep stratum of 
consciousness that phenomenologists call lived experience. Poets reveal by 
means of rhetoric the life of the emotions. They are, Starobinski believes, the 
―mouth of shadow.‖5 Of the myriad reasons that one might have for creating 
art, Starobinski consistently emphasizes one: to describe, explore, and, in a 
very particular sense, satisfy one’s own desires. The result in personal terms 
for the artist can be profound. One finds that one has not only found a way of 
reckoning with the frustrations of the past, but has, through the power of the 
imagination, begun to escape them and germinate a different future. The 
upshot is that we transcend and create ourselves by seeking in artistic 
creativity what we lack. 
 A signature Starobinskian insight is that this structure of the 
expression of desire has defining implications for art criticism. The literary 
text may disguise and dissimulate the author’s desire, but it also reveals it. 
Starobinski’s conviction is that the author’s real-world desires do ineluctably 
reappear in the work in some configuration. They may not be directly 
perceptible in the work’s manifest content, but they may be discerned, 
apperceived, or otherwise inferred at the level of a certain latent content, a 
latent content           [continued overleaf]  
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that is not in the end obscured behind the text like a face behind a mask, but 
ultimately understood to be engrained in the text itself. According to the 
Starobinskian account of the phenomenology of critical literary experience, 
over time one becomes aware as a reader of a complex organic and personal 
presence that has structure and organization, desiderata and motivations. The 
literary work in its totality accordingly comes to be apprehended by the 
attentive critic as a plexus of revealed intentions. 
 This brings us very close to much that is central to Starobinski’s 
affinity with Freud. Starobinski readily acknowledges his enormous debt to 
psychoanalysis, and admires Freud’s exegesis of various literary works.6 The 
similarities between the respective tasks of the psychoanalyst and the critic 
run deeper than simply the imposition of the presumption of intelligibility on 
their analysands. To be sure, both the psychoanalyst and the literary critic are 
engaged in a project of interpretation. They both attend carefully in the first 
instance to what is manifestly given, with a view to discerning what remains 
hidden or latent. They both seek to expose desire lying below the surface. Yet 
psychoanalysts are often inclined, furthermore, to view their patients 
precisely in literary terms. The patient him/herself becomes an expressly 
literary object of study when encouraged by the analyst to produce life 
narratives and free associations, and to describe the content of his or her 
dreams.
7
 
Starobinski, when first confronted with a literary work, seeks the same 
kind of vigilant neutrality that an analyst directs toward a new patient.
8
 As a 
critic, one must in this sense simply take in what is given before underlying 
themes and features begin to take shape. Only after primordial impressions 
have been made may one proceed, quite possibly by employing other 
techniques originating from the field of psychoanalysis, in order to bring to 
light key relations between ostensibly aleatory phenomena. 
 Yet Starobinski’s incorporation of Freudian thought is not without its 
tensions. Certain dissonances are traceable to a fundamental disagreement 
over the status of psychoanalysis as a discipline. Freud believed that his 
project of investigating mental experiences and the unconscious belonged to 
the domain of science. Yet Starobinski observes that the experiences of 
patients are always unique; that the patients’ experiences of their symptoms 
are affective; and that psychoanalysis does not employ experimentation or 
measurement in the normal scientific sense.
9
 If the phenomena of 
psychoanalysis are affective, it is reasonable to enquire into the implications 
of this fact for the language of psychoanalysis. Freud himself registers an 
awareness that terms like ―narcissistic‖ and ―oedipal‖ are approximate and  
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metaphorical. Yet, crucially, he also expresses a desire that such 
approximations should eventually be replaced with the language of hard 
sciences like physiology and biochemistry. Starobinski’s difference with 
Freud stems from the view that the hope for such a discursive development 
within the discipline of psychoanalysis is fundamentally misconceived. 
 Secondly, Starobinski observes that Freud’s scientific conception of 
psychoanalysis places constraints on the manner in which Freud seeks to 
apply psychoanalysis to the study of art. In particular, Starobinski is 
concerned that Freud’s engagement with art is oriented toward a reductive 
analysis.
10
 Freud’s reductive tendency is exemplified in his compensatory 
theory of art, according to which artistic creativity amounts to a substitution 
by the imagination for an object that the artist desires but cannot obtain. Thus, 
artistic creativity comes to be understood as an attempt by the artist to repair 
an unhappy relationship with the world. Starobinski is concerned about the 
adequacy of Freud’s compensatory theory of art, on the grounds that it 
becomes facile when it tries to explain a literary work solely in terms of the 
author’s life up until the time of writing it. The compensatory theory seems to 
overlook the fact that the act of creating a literary work is also an important 
and formative part of the author’s life. The life cannot be said to determine 
the work, if the work is itself part of the life.
11
 
 To envisage psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline through and 
through would be to commit oneself toward an eradication of the 
imprecisions of literary language in psychoanalytic discourse. Starobinski 
attributes to Freud the assumption that to fail to do so could leave the 
discipline vulnerable to a similar kind of critique as that expressed in the 
compensatory theory of art. This leads Starobinski to the view that in Freud’s 
writings there is a kind of repression going on: a repression of the literary. 
Starobinski believes that Freud represses the idea that there should be a 
literary dimension proper to the field of psychoanalysis itself.
12
 
 Is Starobinski trying to out-Freud Freud? Arguably so, and the 
corollary to Starobinski’s repression hypothesis is not difficult to anticipate. 
A return of the repressed is what Starobinski attempts to locate in the 
Freudian corpus. The key to this discovery lies in the recognition of the fact 
that many of the mental phenomena that Freud describes are affective in 
nature. The language of psychoanalysis is itself figurative and metaphorical in 
order to cope with the demands of describing affectivity. Starobinski points 
out, for instance, that Freud’s rhetoric often plays with light and dark: the 
contrast between what appears and what is hidden; that Freud’s syntax and 
vocabulary often have a mythopoetical element; that Freud’s account of the 
economy of libidinal energy          [continued overleaf]   
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is allegorical.
13
 In short, Starobinski argues that the nature of the objects 
under Freud’s scrutiny demand that psychoanalysis should be trapped in 
metaphor, and compels Freud to borrow and incorporate concepts from 
literary criticism. 
 At one level, Starobinski sees value in adopting the Freudian attitude. 
Much of Starobinski’s literary criticism seems to be imbued with, in one way 
or another, the tincture of the analyst-analysand relation. At a different level, 
however, in the context of this alignment, an important critique of Freud is 
also developed. It is a critique which has implications for the interdisciplinary 
relation between psychoanalysis and literary criticism, and which thereby 
helps us to re-imagine, beyond what Freud ever envisaged, the status and 
possible future for psychoanalysis as a discipline. 
 
3: Starobinski and Rousseau 
 
Is Starobinski’s relation to Rousseau similarly dialectical? The respective and 
notably polymathic interests of Starobinski and Rousseau coincide perhaps 
most strongly around questions of otherness, and the intersubjective 
significance of literature. Starobinski’s engagement with Rousseau naturally 
has its historical and philosophical dimensions, but beyond these the powerful 
gaze to which Starobinski subjects Rousseau is also infused with a self-
reflexive subtext of literary theoretical questions. Rousseau functions 
ultimately not only as the object of study, but also as a case study in literary 
criticism, from which it is hoped that wider theoretical conclusions may be 
drawn. Criticism, as Starobinski suggests in his essay The Critical Relation, is 
ultimately obliged to look beyond the textual object and its concomitant 
world, towards a ―generalisation of its discoveries,‖ toward ―a theory (in the 
sense of theoria, intellectual contemplation) of literature.‖14 
Meta-critical and theoretical questions are therefore seldom absent 
from the horizon of Starobinski’s thought. What are the ends of criticism? In 
what sense can the text of Rousseau’s work be said to be revelatory of 
Rousseau himself? More generally, what responsible function can the term 
―author‖ credibly take on in literary theoretical discourse? In these senses, in 
the broad sweep of Rousseau’s thought, and in particular in Rousseau’s own 
reflections upon the nature of literature, the ends it might serve, and his 
envisaged directions for its potential transformation, Starobinski finds a 
fruitful way into some central theoretical and meta-critical questions relating 
to the very possibility of literary self-disclosure, the role of the critical 
imagination, and the nature of interpretation.  
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 The striking, indeed revolutionary, feature of Rousseau’s literary 
ambitions, and his ambitions for literature itself, is the way in which he 
sweeps aside the notion of literary language as a common property or tool for 
the production of meaning that is in some substantive sense distinct from the 
author’s own subjectivity. Instead, the work is understood to somehow 
(Rousseau’s failure to adequately explicate this is ultimately significant) 
embody the author’s very being. As Starobinski puts it, Rousseau ―was the 
first to experience the dangerous compact between ego and language, the 
―new alliance‖ in which man makes himself the word.‖15 It is this theoretical 
paradigm shift, entailing an authorial re-appropriation and re-assimilation of 
language, which leads Starobinski to claim that Rousseau ―truly invented a 
new attitude, which became that of modern literature.‖16 
 Given such extraordinary stature accorded to Rousseau, specifically as 
a literary thinker, the paradox of Starobinski’s engagement with Rousseau lies 
in the consistent emphasis Starobinski places upon the significant 
inadequacies in Rousseau’s theoretical understanding of literature. This is 
indeed, I would suggest, the crucial dialectic informing Starobinski’s relation 
to Rousseau. Starobinski’s insight into Rousseau’s aspirations for literature is 
that, while they seem to provide prima facie grounds for dismissing Rousseau 
as (in a certain disparaging sense) a sentimental Romantic, the very fault-lines 
in Rousseau’s implicit manifesto for literature themselves intimate and open 
up radically new and important literary theoretical and meta-critical 
questions. Let us look more closely at what, in Starobinski’s view, seems to 
go wrong in Rousseau’s account. 
 Rousseau’s literary project is bound up with a quest for self-
knowledge. Self-knowledge would seem to be a logical pre-requisite for 
faithful self-portraiture, which is the explicitly stated aim of his Confessions. 
Yet for Rousseau, self-knowledge is not only logically prior to such 
unflinching autobiographical literary production, for as we shall see, self-
knowledge itself is attained precisely in and through such literary endeavor. 
The attainment of new forms of self-knowledge comes to be understood to be 
part of the subjective significance of being an author.  
In the interests of self-knowledge, Rousseau intends in writing his 
Confessions to both re-live past experiences and work at other times as a 
detached self-observer. As Starobinski puts it, Rousseau assigns himself a 
double duty of ―complete unity and total fission.‖17 Rousseau’s view that self-
knowledge stems from both feeling and detachment echoes his ambivalent 
stance toward reflection. To be sure, reflection in the first instance is held to 
fracture the idyllic self-presence for which Rousseau longs.  
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Yet on occasion Rousseau also concedes that a sustained regression to the 
primitive pre-reflective state is impossible. Instead, the unavoidable remedy 
lies in a painstaking and progressive transformation of man through ongoing 
reason and reflection. Reflection, for Rousseau, turns out to be both poison 
and cure. 
 Rousseau’s proposal for a transparency of expression is motivated by 
what Starobinski calls a ―soulful imperative,‖18 an impulse to disclose with 
perspicuity one’s deepest affective states. Let us consider in more detail 
Rousseau’s idea of a literary work being in some sense adequate to the 
author’s phenomenal being. Formulated thus, without reference to a reader as 
such, it amounts to a view that Starobinski is broadly prepared to sustain. 
Starobinski explicates it as a particular form of artistic narcissism. It finds an 
analogy in the myth of Pygmalion, who desired his own artwork (an ivory 
statue) to such a degree that Aphrodite decided to answer his prayer and make 
it come to life. Narcissism of this kind involves a double movement which 
obviates the need for the kind of straightforward self-reflection provided by a 
mirror. One initially alienates oneself in the production of the work, only to 
seek self-communion precisely through engagement with the work. Far from 
disparaging such narcissism, Starobinski stresses its deeply demanding and 
creative nature. Perhaps most importantly, the artistic desire involved is 
bound up with the imagination. For Rousseau, the imagination is the setting 
not only for a kind of curiously perfected yet introverted intersubjectivity, but 
also for an idyllic self-love and self-presence. Pygmalion adores himself in 
what he has made. 
 The suggestion here is that while relations with others may seem only 
to disappoint in comparison with fantasy, an imagined communion with the 
―Other‖ of one’s own artwork offers the catharsis and satisfaction of a perfect 
interaction. It is in this movement that affective adequation is apprehended by 
the artist. The artwork compensates the artist for the disappointments of life, 
for unrequited desire. In communing with his desire, Rousseau attains the 
kind of primitive happiness he craves, in which he is sufficient unto himself. 
I suspect that what is right about this idea is that it captures the 
movement of an entirely plausible account of authentic poetic creation. 
According to this account, the poet in his or her most private moments is 
possessed of a pure motivation not so much to communicate as simply to 
express—to externalise, even expurgate—something that lies within. 
Naturally, the poet has a good sense of when such expression has been 
accomplished, of when the job is done, so to speak. In this case, questions of 
communication, of           [continued overleaf] 
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being understood, are in an important sense secondary, or even immaterial for 
the artist. As Starobinski suggests, Rousseau was arguably among the first to 
seriously give primacy to the expressive function of literary language. But the 
difficulty with Rousseau’s conception of the transparency of expression lies 
in its Janus-like quality of looking both back to the author’s interiority and 
forward to the reader as such. Rousseau’s self-expression always seems to 
have not only an accusative but a dative, an anonymous ―Other‖ to whom 
Rousseau imagines he is disclosing himself. This conception of transparency 
of the text for the reader holds out the promise of a primordial sympathy 
between reader and author of the kind considered earlier, and, in Rousseau’s 
case, thereby overcoming his sense of social alienation. Thus, Rousseau’s 
conception of literary expression ultimately turns out to be a conflation of 
self-expression and self-disclosure. 
 As Starobinski points out, this turns out to be deeply problematic, both 
in literary theoretical terms, and in Rousseau’s personal experience as a 
writer. The author may attain a kind of privileged self-communion in the 
work, but what Rousseau seems to overlook is that for any other reader of the 
work, the experience must necessarily be quite different. For readers other 
than the author, the encounter with a literary work is, as Starobinski puts it, 
―predicated upon loss of the object and its replacement (I do not say 
representation) by words.‖19 Literature is conditioned by the absence and 
inaccessibility of the originating primordial experience. What Starobinski 
calls ―the purity of immediate sentiment,‖20 far from being preserved for 
others, is precisely what is lost, the very moment the ink leaves the writer’s 
pen. And authors become obliged, too, to take existential responsibility for 
the meanings they choose to see in their own work. But for Rousseau, the 
possibility of a proliferation of possible meanings leads only to anxiety about 
hostile and malicious interpretations. His later works, such as Confessions, 
betray a nervous cycle of correction and clarification. 
 Rousseau’s apparent obsessional neurosis about the possibility of his 
writings being misunderstood is suggestive (to Freudian eyes at least) that he 
may have developed for himself the apprehension, unconscious or otherwise, 
that there was something inherently misguided about his aspirations for the 
transparency of literature. Notwithstanding any doubts he may have had, 
however, Rousseau also preferred on occasion to disparage his own writing 
abilities and perpetuate his literary idealism. But Starobinski’s scrutiny of 
Rousseau’s project compels us now to confront the underlying theoretical 
problem that Rousseau unwittingly brings to light: if the very conception of 
literature as some kind of window onto the human heart  [continued overleaf] 
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begins to unravel before Rousseau’s very eyes, to what extent does it make 
sense at all to configure the encounter with a literary work in intersubjective 
terms? 
 Starobinski is certainly alive to the seductions and pitfalls, epistemic 
and moral, of pretensions of being able to divine a soul in the transient play of 
appearances. According to Starobinski, the deepest intellectual concerns of 
The Living Eye [L’Oeil Vivant], published in 1961, were already germinating 
in his mind some twenty years earlier amidst wartime anxiety surrounding the 
captivating power of charismatic leaders. What seems to have chilled the 
young Starobinski was the realization that the charisma of such individuals 
―stemmed essentially from their knowing how to make use of a certain kind 
of mask.‖21 For Starobinski, the perils of being seduced by appearances are 
bound up with a more general problematic of the desirous gaze. And he takes 
seriously the implicit insights and admonitions of classical myth. Poppaea’s 
lovers come to grief because of their impetuous desire to see behind her 
veil.
22
 For the critic who desires to see too much, the risks are also serious. To 
fail to retain some distance from the text is to risk losing one’s bearings in a 
manner which parallels the way in which Rousseau’s persistent desire to see 
into others’ hearts most often ends badly for him, in humiliation, confusion, 
or (in the end) paranoia. In attempting to see what cannot be seen, one is 
prone to fill in the void with a narcissistic projection. In Rousseau’s case, a 
sense of personal guilt, apparently instilled during his puritanical upbringing, 
was not infrequently transformed into the presumption of the silent censure of 
others, the mirage of the hostile gaze. 
 In this context, Starobinski accords some validity to Paul Valéry’s 
view that, at least in the normal course of events, and despite polite 
protestations to the contrary, we never do quite see with perspicuity into other 
people’s affective lives. There is always an essential moment of ambiguity, a 
kind of truncation in empathic precision. Valéry traces the undecidability of 
foreign affectivity to a dialectical moment of signitive disguise that he 
considers to be constitutive of all human relations. ―Human relations are 
based on ciphers,‖ Valéry informs us; ―To decipher is to become confused.‖23 
For Starobinski, part of the significance of this Valérean line of thought lies 
in the sense that, even in the very act of revealing oneself, something is 
always held back, obscured, or deferred. 
Yet this hardly confounds the case for an intersubjective approach to 
literature. To the extent that empathy does take place in human relations, 
should we not at least take seriously the possibility of a literary analogue? 
Starobinski stands by the view that to the extent that a literary work implies  
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thought at all, such thought cannot but be correlated with a consciousness 
employing the available linguistic resources of the times. Starobinski’s own 
dialectical solution to the problem of literary intersubjectivity centers on his 
conception of a work’s implied author. I shall devote most of the remainder 
of this essay to examining this idea more closely.  
 
4: Starobinski’s Critical Gaze 
 
Starobinski’s engagement with Rousseau has put Rousseau’s literary ideals, 
and his manifesto for the transparency of literature, under quite serious 
pressure. Perhaps it is at junctures such as this that the many advantages of 
the critical approaches of the formalists, structuralists, and textualists become 
most apparent. In restricting attention to objectively observable features of the 
work, and to the life of the text itself, difficulties connected with the urge to 
see a hidden source or origin beyond what is manifestly given are 
systematically avoided. Starobinski himself finds merit in, and draws upon 
the insights of, structuralism.
24
 Yet one of the dialectical subtleties of 
Starobinski’s approach to the study of literature lies in the importance, indeed 
necessity, that he attaches to traditional philological rigor in tracking down, to 
the maximum scholarly extent possible, the nature of a given text’s originary 
historico-linguistic context. To be sure, for Starobinski, cultural context and 
supposed Zeitgeist are not in themselves wholly adequate explanations of the 
literary work. The greatest authors not only subsist within their cultural 
environment, but kick against it, innovating and invigorating the very womb 
from which they are born. Yet this very individuality can only become fully 
delineable and intelligible against its contemporary cultural backdrop. 
Starobinski studies Rousseau in his socio-historical context precisely to 
illuminate Rousseau’s radical differentiation and innovation. And 
Starobinski’s point of departure from the formalists lies in the view that the 
literary text cannot ultimately be properly distilled or withdrawn from the 
passage of history. For this reason, he does not equivocate on the point that a 
diligent undertaking of the usual philological groundwork—the determination 
of ―precise definitions of words in their historical context,‖ for example, and 
―establishing scrupulously accurate texts‖25 in the first place—is quite simply 
a prerequisite for any subsequent critical work, regardless of interpretive 
brilliance. 
Even so, Starobinski’s methodological interest in literary origins 
should not be interpreted as evidence of a literary theoretical commitment, at 
least           [continued overleaf] 
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in terms of the most crucial and distinctive aspects of his theoretical position, 
to a conception of ―author‖ as necessarily absented and distantiated across the 
divide of historical time. Starobinski’s theoretical understanding of literature 
ultimately moves well beyond the terms and ambit of a purely philological 
discourse. Nonetheless, in Blindness and Insight, Paul de Man claims that in 
his treatment of Rousseau, Starobinski is attempting to intuit truths about the 
historical Rousseau, truths that lie beyond the ostensible meaning of what 
Rousseau actually wrote.
26
 In the preface to The Living Eye, however, 
Starobinski, while admitting that his critical perspective may require some 
supplementary clarification, convincingly answers de Man’s charge by 
pointing out that Rousseau himself urges his readers not to read him at face 
value. Starobinski insists that his critical interest never alters its focus from 
the Rousseau as author implicit across the entirety of Rousseau’s work. For 
Starobinski, the literary text is not conceived as a mask behind which a pre-
given author is a priori condemned to concealment, but instead as precisely a 
privileged disclosure of a particular and distinctive conscious interiority. 
 For Starobinski, the idea that a literary work should be correlated with 
an individual consciousness is not an isolated critical theme or mere 
phenomenological detail, but instead goes to the nucleus of his conception of 
what literature turns out to be, at least in its greatest and most significant 
manifestations. To adumbrate such individuality, it is not sufficient for a work 
to simply employ a given language, to operate it according to its grammatical 
and syntactical requirements, and according to one’s referential intentions, 
that is, to master it as one masters a bicycle to accomplish a specified journey, 
no matter how original or pioneering that journey may be. The literary work 
is distinguished from other instances of language usage by the fact that it 
changes the language in some way, and makes it its own. Literature ruptures 
the determinacy of language, in the sense that it is both conditioned by and 
conditions its language. The autonomy of literature gives it, in a very peculiar 
sense, the power to change the course of history: it can alter the shapes of 
consciousness in a dialectical action of compliance with, and subversion of, 
its language. As Starobinski sees it, the essential tension of literature is that it 
is both a ―celebration‖ and a ―profanation‖ of language.27 It is, in particular, 
this aspect of profanation which enables the correlation of a text with an 
individuated and distinctive consciousness, and informs Starobinski’s 
fundamental intuition that literature is ―intimately associated with a personal 
way of being in the world‖.28 
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The ―profanation‖ of language of which Starobinski speaks can be 
understood in multiple ways. In one sense, at work here is an image of trauma 
and transgression. Writers, though existing within, or in relation to, a 
prevalent culture, make their way out of the temple of the cultural Logos, of 
linguistic and spoken conformity, toward a more marginal, semi-detached 
vantage point. From belonging within, the writer withdraws into a kind of 
parasitic ambivalence, if not overt hostility. Starobinski observes that the 
outstanding works of modern literature tend to relate to the world by rejecting 
it in some way. The opposition to culture comes to be reflected in the 
violation of its literary and linguistic norms. At some level (precisely which, 
the critic must judge) the work remains internally consistent, yet stubbornly 
opposed to its outside. It falls to the critic to uncover the signs of aberrance 
and destructuring manifestly or latently operating within the work.
29
 
 Yet Starobinski also recognizes that literature’s profanation of 
language is not always obviously traumatic. There is a more emollient way in 
which literature announces its cultural differentiation and individuation, and it 
involves bending and deforming language out of its customary shapes and 
contours. At this level, the question of hostile transgression becomes less 
prominent, and language’s profanation becomes, too, its celebration. The 
writer may have left the temple, but may also turn outside to face it, to stand 
before it. While the style of a work may break or vitiate its host language, it 
may equally bend it and place it under the torsions of a personal rhetoric. 
Either way, the notion of literary style, for Starobinski, has now become 
intimately, even inseparably, associated with existential style. Such ―style‖ 
can push expressive capacity and suppleness to its limits. Style as such has 
now become something more substantive than a vague reference to a work’s 
way with words. Style is now not only surface but somehow contiguous with 
existential reality, not only artistic appearance but an opening onto authorial 
being. 
 In this respect, Starobinski believes that, for all of Rousseau’s 
excesses, there is still something to be learnt from Rousseau’s ambitions for 
style: Rousseau understands style’s simultaneously subversive and authentic 
moments. Rousseau comes to the view that the nature of style, or at least of 
the kind of style that his own autobiographical endeavours require, must be 
far more radical than merely the superficial, expedient, or even cynical 
employment of rhetorical technique and literary artifice. The allegiance of 
style lies not with accepted fashions or mannerisms, with the prevalent 
cultural grooves of expression (no matter how intricate or sophisticated  
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they may have become) made familiar in the daily traffic of social encounters, 
but with the impulses, motivations, and directions of the individual’s 
conscious interiority. The production of an authentic style amounts to the 
invention of a new language, or what one might call the creation of a personal 
dictionary. As Rousseau pledges in Confessions, 
 
I will always have whatever style comes to me; I shall change it 
without scruple according to my mood; I shall say each thing as I 
feel it, as I see it, without straining for effect, without 
embarrassment, and without worrying about the mixture of colours. 
By surrendering to the impression received and to the sentiment of 
the moment, I shall paint the state of my soul twice over, at the 
moment the event occurred and at the moment I wrote it down.
30
 
 
Even as Rousseau elaborates his philosophy of style, the cracks in his position 
become more apparent. While his literary aim is clearly fixed (or fixated) on 
self-immediacy and self-transparency, he finds himself driven to a signitive 
metaphor to capture the operations of his authorial processes: an image of 
painting. The difficulty here is that representation is somehow being conflated 
with presentation. A painting of Rousseau does not render present Rousseau, 
except in the most hyperbolic of views. If it did, one would perceive 
Rousseau, not a painting of him. Depending upon the skills of the artist, 
Rousseau may be said to be depicted, but in depiction, qua depiction, the 
transparency of immediacy is ineluctably lost. 
 Starobinski intimates precisely this problem when summarizing 
Rousseau’s understanding of the function of style: ―Style [for Rousseau] 
points infallibly to the author’s inward truth.‖31 It would seem that the aporia 
in Rousseau’s thought has now been relayed into Starobinski’s paraphrase, in 
which ―painting‖ has become ―pointing,‖ and that Starobinski’s very effort to 
convey Rousseau’s view coherently results in the dubious idea of an infallible 
pointing. But pointing, like painting, necessarily implies distance, and 
distance surely precludes infallibility. 
 I alluded earlier to some of the alternative theoretical approaches to 
literature which could be said to bypass the troubling question of 
intersubjectivity. The siren call of scepticism would seem to offer the modern 
critic a comfortable way out, a resigned, even quietly relieved, retreat into the 
dispassionate impersonal analyses of structure, form, and text. The sceptical 
escape route even seems attuned, on the face of it, to the very ethos of 
detached critical discourse. To simply look carefully at a text, instead of  
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curiously, even desirously, into it, is to remain discretely isolated from the 
difficult involvements of empathy and feeling, and, in short, the personal 
encounter. 
 The originality of Starobinski’s ultimate critical response to Rousseau 
lies in the fact that he does not straightforwardly discard the spirit of 
Rousseau’s intersubjective aspirations as some kind of hopeless artifact of a 
discredited form of Romantic idealism. The Starobinskian insight into 
Rousseau is to observe just how close Rousseau actually comes to a cogent 
view of the intersubjectivity of literature. Rousseau is fundamentally right, in 
Starobinski’s view, to propose and pursue the idea that questions of 
intersubjectivity go to the heart of what it is to be a writer, and of what it is, in 
turn, to encounter as a reader a work of literature. Rousseau loves truth, and 
values highly the love of truth. But he is dissatisfied with reason, and 
suspicious of self-conscious reflection. He sees truth as bound up with the 
passions, and configures intersubjectivity in terms of a disclosure of the 
passionate truth of the Other. In the sense of wanting to preempt a topology of 
the self as comprising an inside and an outside, Rousseau has aspirations 
toward a primordial unity with others, and understands, in his own way, 
literature to be a passage toward the authentic disclosure of the truths of 
phenomenal being.  
Rousseau’s difficulties, however, at both a theoretical and a personal 
level, seem to be connected to an inadequate grasp of the relation between 
appearance and reality in the context of encountering the Other. Rousseau 
sets out in his literary work, and often too in the encounters described in his 
Confessions, to somehow circumvent external appearances. He desires to bare 
his own heart, and to see directly into other people’s. Yet his literary 
dissatisfactions, and his social disconnections, suggest that his project has 
ultimately turned out to be even more complicated than he had initially 
anticipated. Starobinski’s reading of Rousseau interprets this not so much a 
failure, but as a discovery. Rousseau has run up against a structural 
problematic underlying the encounter with otherness, which Starobinski 
construes in terms of a dialectic of transparency and obstruction.  
It is a conundrum that Starobinski not only draws attention to, but also 
wants to begin to solve for himself. Starobinski has the edge over Rousseau in 
this regard, since Starobinski has at his disposal certain discoveries and 
resources belonging to disciplines that Rousseau could scarcely have foreseen 
or imagined. One of these disciplines is psychoanalysis, the beam of which 
Starobinski attempts to direct not only at Rousseau himself, and his 
predicament, but more generally into what he, Starobinski, regards as  
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core issues in literary and critical theory. One way in which Starobinski 
accomplishes this is by bringing to light certain blind-spots in Romantic 
conceptions of literary self-expression, and of the intersubjective significance 
of literature. One of the Romantic aporia that concerns Starobinski is the 
mistaken conflation of self-expression with self-disclosure, a conflation that 
neglects the idea that something may always be deferred in the empathic 
encounter with the Other. The necessary possibility of a truncation in 
empathic precision entails that the guarantee of what Starobinski calls the 
―purity of immediate sentiment‖ will be lost for even the most careful of 
readers, other than, perhaps, the original author him/herself. Possible 
meanings will ramify and proliferate for different readers. And an 
hermeneutic jeopardy opens up for critics, such that in attempting to see what 
cannot be seen, one may be prone to fill in the void with a narcissistic 
projection. 
Psychoanalysis aside, Starobinski also makes judicious use of the 
insights to be found in twentieth-century phenomenology. It would be too 
restrictive to try to cast Starobinski as simply an Husserlian literary theorist. 
This is so, not only due to the Freudian connection, but because his thought is 
also influenced, in ways whose adequate exploration lies beyond the remit of 
this article, by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. We may say with certainty that 
Starobinski’s conception of the encounter with the personality of the implied 
author of a literary work is profoundly influenced by the way in which the 
phenomenological movement that Husserl founded became deeply interested 
in certain forms of co-givenness involving the structure of the constitution of 
a phenomenal unity that cannot be rendered intelligible by appealing to 
notions of signification or indication, and in the phenomenological discovery 
that under certain conditions, as Edith Stein paraphrases Johannes Volkelt, 
―[t]he experiences we comprehend in expressive appearances are fused 
[verschmolzen] with the phenomena of expression.‖32 The distinctiveness of 
Starobinski’s conception of the implied author lies in the way he draws upon 
the phenomenological tradition in order to find a way of upholding something 
of the Romantic conviction in the centrality of feeling and empathy in literary 
experience. Yet in doing so, Starobinski delineates aspects of the 
interpersonal encounter, and of the relation between appearance and reality, 
that various Romantics (I include Rousseau here) preferred to ignore, but 
which turn out, on the Husserlian account at least, to be constitutive of 
intersubjectivity itself. It is in this regard that Starobinski’s account of the 
implied author turns out to link the purely phenomenological exploration of 
intersubjectivity and           [continued overleaf] 
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the imagination undertaken by thinkers like Husserl, Stein, and Merleau-
Ponty, with literary theoretical questions pertaining to the apperception of a 
personality sunken within an extended text or collection of texts. The implied 
author is textually inherent. 
 
5: Conclusion 
 
A more lengthy disquisition on Starobinski’s thought would help to bring out 
in greater detail the ways in which he denies neither that objective textual 
analysis is important to literary criticism, nor that the literary work always 
remains essentially open to multiple readings, and that critics ultimately find 
themselves to be existentially implicated and entangled in the forces at work 
in their own interpretations. Yet perhaps the most theoretically decisive 
aspect of his thought, the commitment which, on my reading at least, governs 
his fundamental understanding of criticism, is the view that the literary work 
itself, in conjunction with (yet moving beyond) purely historical and 
philological enquiry, has the capacity to grant readers an intersubjectively 
privileged insight into the intentionality of the Other, that is, that the work 
possesses and opens onto an inherent authorial consciousness. 
 This conception of the inherence of what is Other leads Starobinski to 
regard the interiority of the inherent author as a kind of latency within the 
work. The Other’s experience, precisely in being that of an Other, is not, to 
the reader’s eye and mind, primordially accessible and apprehensible in the 
manner in which the textual surface and its manifest semantic value could be 
said to be. The Other is present within the work, neither manifest at the 
surface nor hermetically sealed behind the symbols of the text. Instead, the 
Other is accessible via the text, susceptible to what Starobinski calls a 
―greater penetration‖ into the work, toward its ―second meaning.‖33 We are 
dealing here with neither an encryption nor a straightforward occlusion. The 
critic’s work is not at root to be understood as a project of deciphering, 
accomplished with the hypothesizing guile common to allegorical or 
psychoanalytical interpretations, but rather as a much more direct seeing into 
the work, an apperceptual penetration. I take this to be the ―optics‖ of 
Starobinski’s Oeil Vivant. 
 The textual Other is never disjoint from its textual appearance because 
its principal presenting aspect is that of literary style, the expression of  
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authorial individuality in the ―profanation‖ of language. For this reason, the 
search for what is deepest in a work often returns to what is formally and 
semantically relatively near to the surface of the text. Starobinski intimates 
this deeply phenomenological idea of a transcending of the appearance/reality 
opposition in the following way: 
 
Frequently the search for what is most remote leads to what is 
nearest at hand: to what was obvious at first glance, the forms and 
rhythms that seemed merely to hold the promise of a secret message. 
After a long detour we come back to the words themselves, where 
meaning chooses to reside, and that gleaming mysterious treasure 
we had felt compelled to seek in a ―deeper dimension.‖34 
 
Literary façade and underlying being are ultimately fused into coherence: 
there can be no circumvention of the text. And in the literary as in the purely 
phenomenological domain, Starobinski suggests, we find the ontological 
force of the appearance/reality dichotomy to have been all but neutralized. 
 My claim is that an important part of Jean Starobinski’s intellectual 
significance stems from his ability to contemplate the critical gaze through 
the prisms of two of modernity’s most significant and influential ―mind 
sciences‖: psychoanalysis and phenomenology. His project is directed not so 
much toward the development of a manifesto for the future of literature, as a 
clarification and a disclosure of what great literary works very often (I do not 
say always) truly are, in the light of important developments in the social 
sciences and the humanities. He has other prisms in his repertoire, notably 
that of existentialism.  
The trajectory of Starobinski’s thought has now taken us from a 
strictly psychophysical conception of ―author‖ to one belonging to pure 
consciousness. The concept of author has been transposed from 
embeddedness within history into the domain of the imagination. For this 
reason, Starobinski understands the intersubjective latency of the text to be 
―the vaster life or transfigured death inherent in it.‖35 The death to which 
Starobinski refers is that of the original living intentions of the historical 
author, a necessary death, promised and predicted in the undoing of 
Rousseau’s fated hopes for literary self-transparency. Yet the ―author’s lived 
intentions‖ as such find a sense in which they can meaningfully survive, but 
only in a ―transfigured‖ and nonprimordial form, buried yet readable within 
the permanence of a text. 
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